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Abstract
We consider an application of multi-armed bandits to internet advertising (specifically, to dynamic
ad allocation in the pay-per-click model, with uncertainty on the click probabilities). We focus on an
important practical issue that advertisers are constrained in how much money they can spend on their
ad campaigns. This issue has not been considered in the prior work on bandit-based approaches for ad
allocation, to the best of our knowledge.
We define a simple, stylized model where an algorithm picks one ad to display in each round, and
each ad has a budget: the maximal amount of money that can be spent on this ad. This model admits a
natural variant of UCB1, a well-known algorithm for multi-armed bandits with stochastic rewards. We
derive strong provable guarantees for this algorithm.
1 Introduction
Multi-armed bandits (henceforth, MAB), and more generally online decision problems with partial feedback
and exploration-exploitation tradeoff, has been studied since 1930’s in Operations Research, Economics and
several branches of Computer Science [26, 13, 16, 11]. Such problems arise in diverse domains, e.g., the
design of medical experiments, dynamic pricing, and routing in the internet. In the past decade, a surge of
interest in MAB problems has been due to their applications in web search and internet advertising.
In the most basic MAB problem [2], an algorithm repeatedly chooses among several possible actions
(traditionally called arms), and observes the reward for the chosen arm. The rewards are stochastic: the
reward from choosing a given arm is an independent sample from some distribution that depends on the
arm but not on the round in which this arm is chosen. These reward distributions are not revealed to the
algorithm. The algorithm’s goal is to maximize the total expected reward over the time horizon.
This paper is concerned with an application of MAB to Internet advertising. This application considers
advertisers that derive value when users click on their ads. A predominant market design for such advertisers
is pay-per-click: advertisers pay only when their ads are clicked. Users arrive over time, and an algorithm
needs to choose which ads to show to each user. Both the ad market and the advertisers experience significant
uncertainty on click probabilities;1 the estimates of CTRs can be refined over time. It is because of this
uncertainty on CTRs that MAB are relevant to this application domain.
A standard, and very stylized, way to model these ad-related issues in the MAB framework is as follows
(e.g., see [22]). An algorithm chooses one ad in each round (so ads correspond to arms in MAB), and
observes whether this ad is clicked on. For each click on every ad i, algorithm receives a fixed payment
∗Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. Email: slivkins@microsoft.com. Parts of this
work has been done while visiting Microsoft Research New York.
1Click probabilities are also called click-through rates in the industry, or CTRs for short.
1
bi from the corresponding advertiser. Thus, the expected reward from showing ad i is equal to bi times the
CTR for this ad. The CTRs are not initially known to the algorithm. The algorithm’s goal is to maximize
the total expected reward.
To the best of our knowledge, prior work on MAB-based approaches to ad allocation has ignored an
important practical issue: advertisers are constrained in how much money they can spend on their ad cam-
paign. In particular, each advertiser typically has a budget: the maximal amount of money she is allowed to
spend. This is the issue that we focus on in this paper.
1.1 Problem formulation: BudgetedAdsMAB
There are k advertisers (arms), each with one ad that she wishes to be displayed. Each ad i is characterized
by the following three quantities: CTR µi ∈ [0, 1], payment-per-click bi and budget Bi. The payments-per-
click and the budgets are revealed to the algorithm, but the CTRs are not.
In each round an algorithm picks one ad. This ad is displayed (receives an impression), and the algorithm
observes whether this ad is clicked on. The click on a given ad i happens independently (from everything
else), with probability µi. If ad i is clicked, the corresponding advertiser is charged bi, and her remaining
budget is decreased by this amount. An arm is available (can be chosen) in a given round only if its
remaining budget is above bi. There is a time horizon T . The goal of the algorithm is to maximize its
expected total reward, where the total reward is the sum of all charges.
This is a non-Bayesian (prior-independent) formulation: there are no priors on the CTRs that are avail-
able to the algorithm, and we are looking for guarantees that hold for any prior.
The expected value of one impression of arm i is wi , bi µi. For ease of exposition, we re-order the
arms so that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wk.
Benchmark. We use the omniscient benchmark, standard benchmark in the literature on MAB and related
problems. This is the best algorithm that knows all latent information in the problem instance (in this case,
the CTRs). In this problem, the omniscient benchmark is very simple: play arm 1 while it is available, then
play arm 2 while it is available, and so on. Call it the greedy benchmark. Performance of an algorithm A is
measured as greedy regret (regret with respect to the greedy benchmark), defined as expected reward of the
greedy benchmark minus the expected reward of the algorithm. Denote it Regret(A).
It is worth noting that, given the optimality of the greedy benchmark, the best fixed arm – another
standard benchmark in the literature on MAB – is not informative for our setting.
1.2 Our contributions
We consider a natural algorithm and prove that it works quite well. While the algorithm is essentially the
first thing a researcher familiar with prior work on MAB would suggest, our technical contribution is the
analysis of this algorithm, and particularly the “coupling argument” therein. The conceptual contribution is
that we provide an assurance that the natural approach works, from a theoretical point of view, and suggest
the strengths and limitations of this approach.
Our algorithm, called BudgetedUCB, is a natural modification of UCB1 [2], a well-known algorithm
for MAB with stochastic rewards. UCB1 maintains a numerical score (index) for each arm, and in every
round chooses an arm with the largest index. The index of arm i is, essentially, the best available upper
confidence bound on the expected reward from this arm. BudgetedUCB chooses, in each round, an arm with
the maximal index among all available arms. (So the two algorithms coincide if the budgets are infinite.)
We formulate our provable guarantees in terms of the last arm whose budget is exhausted by the greedy
benchmark. (Recall that the arms i are ordered in the order of decreasing wi = bi µi.) Denote this last arm
iB if it exists; set iB = 0 otherwise. Since iB is a random variable, the regret bound is in expectation over the
2
randomness in iB. For most problem instances iB is highly concentrated: it is typically within ±1 from its
expectation.
Theorem 1.1. Consider BudgetedAdsMAB. For each ǫ > 0 it holds that
Regret(BudgetedUCB) ≤ ǫT +O(log T ) E

 max
i∈{iB, iB+1}
k∑
j=i+1
b2j
max(ǫ, wi − wj)

 , (1)
where the expectation is over the randomness in iB.
The regret bound (1) is driven by the differences ∆(i) = wi − wi+1, more specifically by the random
quantity ∆(iB). We derive a “pessimistic” corollary for the case when ∆(iB) may be arbitrarily small, and
an “optimistic” corollary for the case of large ∆(iB). 2
Corollary 1.2. Consider BudgetedAdsMAB. Denote v2 = 1
k
∑k
j=1 b
2
j .
(a) Regret(BudgetedUCB) ≤ O(v√kT log T ).
(b) Regret(BudgetedUCB) ≤ O (k
δ
v2 log T
) for any δ > 0 such that Pr[∆(iB) ≥ δ] ≥ 1− (v/T )2.
The regret bounds in this corollary extend the corresponding “pessimistic” and “optimistic” guarantees
for UCB1 from the special case of MAB with stochastic rewards (i.e., no budgets and bj ≡ 1) to the full
generality of BudgetedAdsMAB.3 Both guarantees are nearly optimal for this special case, respectively
up to O(log T ) factors and up to constant factors [20, 2, 3].
Interestingly, all above regret bounds do not depend on the budgets.
1.3 Discussion
One common criticism of the work on non-Bayesian (prior-independent, regret-minimizing) MAB problems
is that the algorithmic ideas and proof techniques introduced for the numerous MAB models studied in the
literature are too specific to their respective models, and do not easily generalize to more general settings that
are common in applications. In view of this criticism, it is useful to identify general ideas and techniques
that one can build on when working on the (more) general settings, and provide concrete examples of how
one can build on them. The present paper contributes to this direction: we build on the algorithmic idea
of “UCB indices”, and a certain proof technique to analyze them (both from [2]). These ideas have been
tremendously useful in several other MAB settings with stochastic rewards e.g. [19, 30, 12, 24, 1].
It is worth noting that BudgetedUCB does not need to input the budgets: instead, it can be implemented
via an oracle that determines whether a given arm is available in a given round. In other words, advertisers
do not need to submit their budgets upfront; instead, they only need to notify the algorithm whether they
are still willing to participate in a given round. This is useful because an advertiser may be reluctant to
commit to a specific budget and/or reveal it early in her ad campaign. Also, she may choose to strategically
misreport the budget if asked.
2To derive Corollary 1.2, we pick ǫ =
√
log T
kT
in Equation (1) for part (a), and ǫ = kv2/T 2 for part (b).
3Without budgets, we have iB = 1 and therefore the assumption in Corollary 1.2(b) reduces to ∆(1) ≥ δ.
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2 Our algorithm: BudgetedUCB
Our algorithm, called BudgetedUCB, is a natural extension of the well-known algorithm UCB1 [2].
For each arm i and time t, let ci(t) and ni(t) be, respectively, the number of clicks and the number of
impressions of this arm up to (but not including) time t. Define the confidence radius of arm i as
ri(t) , C
√
log T
1 + ni(t)
. (2)
Here C is some constant to be chosen later. Informally, the meaning of ri(t) is that
|µi(t)− νi(t)| ≤ ri(t) (3)
holds with high probability, where νi(t) , ci(t)/ni(t) is the (current) average CTR.
Define the UCB index of arm i as
Ii(t) , bi(νi(t) + ri(t)).
Note that the index of arm i is an upper confidence bound (UCB) on the quantity biµi which represents the
expected value of one impression of i.
Now that the index is defined, the algorithm is very simple: among available arms, pick an arm with the
maximal index, breaking ties arbitrarily.
Discussion. The original algorithm UCB1 in [2] is, essentially, a special case of BudgetedUCBwhen all arms
are available and all values are bi = 1. Moreover, the algorithm in [19] for sleeping bandits with stochastic
rewards coincides with ours for bi ≡ 1 (but the analysis from [19] does not carry over to our setting, see
Section 4 for more discussion).
Most likely, the log T in the definition of the confidence radius can be replaced by log t, which should
lead to improved constant factors in the regret bounds. In particular, the algorithms in [2] and [19] have
log t there. We use log T because it makes our analysis easier, and increases the regret by at most a constant
factor.
3 Analysis: proof of Theorem 1.1
The technical contribution of this paper is the analysis of BudgetedUCB. The crux thereof is the “coupling
argument” encapsulated in Lemma 3.5. To argue about random clicks, an important conceptual step is to
consider two different representations of realized clicks (defined below). Also, we build on the technique
from the analysis of UCB1 [2], which is encapsulated in Lemma 3.4.
Notation. Consider an execution of BudgetedUCB. For each arm i, let ni(t) be the number of impressions
of arm i before round t. Let ni = ni(T + 1) be the total number of impressions from arm i. Let ~n =
(n1, . . . , nk) be the impressions vector for BudgetedUCB. Similarly, let ~m be the impressions vector for the
greedy benchmark. Note that ~n and ~m are random variables. Let ~w = (w1, . . . , wk), where wi = bi µi.
Click realizations. We will use two ways to represent the realization of the random clicks. Each represen-
tation is a 0-1 matrix, denoted Y = (Yi,t) and Y ′ = (Y ′i,t) respectively, where rows i range over ads and
columns t range over rounds. The first representation, called per-round realization, is as follows: if arm
i is selected in round t then it is clicked if and only if Yi,t = 1. The second realization, called the stack
realization, is as follows: the t-th time arm i is selected, it is clicked if and only if Y ′i,t = 1. Note that for
each pair (i, t), both Yi,t and Y ′i,t are independent 0-1 random variables with expectation µi.
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While each of the two representations suffices to formally represent the random clicks, we find it con-
venient to use both. In particular, the per-round realization is used in Claim 3.1, and the stack realization is
used in Claim 3.3 and in the coupling argument in Lemma 3.5.
Claim 3.1. E[Reward(BudgetedUCB)] = E[~n · ~w].
Proof. Let Xit ∈ {0, 1} be 1 if and only if arm i is selected in round t. Let {Yi,t} be the per-round
realization. Since for each pair (i, t) the random variables Xi,t and Yi,t are mutually independent, it follows
that
E[Xi,t Yi,t] = E[Xi,t]E[Yi,t] = µi E[Xi,t].
Noting that Reward(BudgetedUCB) =
∑
i,t biXi,tYi,t, we have
E[Reward(BudgetedUCB)] =
∑
i,t bi E[Xi,tYi,t]
=
∑
i,t bi µi E[Xi,t]
=
∑
i bi µi E[
∑
tXi,t]
=
∑
iwi E[ni].
Similarly, expected reward of the greedy benchmark is E[~n · ~w].
Corollary 3.2. Regret(BudgetedUCB) = E[(~m− ~n) · ~w].
We pick the constant C in Equation (2) so that Equation (3) holds with really high probability, so that
the failure event when Equation (3) does not hold can, essentially, be ignored in the analysis.4
Claim 3.3. With probability at least 1− 1
T
, for each arm i and each time t Equation (3) holds.
Proof Sketch. Consider the stack realization (Y ′i,t). For each arm i and each time t, apply Chernoff Bounds
to the sum
∑t
s=1 Y
′
i,t (which is the number of clicks in the first t times that arm i is selected). Then take the
Union Bound over all i and all t.
In the rest of the proof we will assume without further notice that the event Equation (3) holds for each
arm i and each time t. Essentially, we will argue deterministically from now on, whereas all “probabilistic”
reasoning is contained in Claim 3.1 and Claim 3.3.
The following lemma says that each sub-optimal arm is not played too often. This is the crucial part of
a UCB-style analysis, and it incorporates the main trick from the original analysis in [2].
Lemma 3.4. Let i∗j be the best (lowest numbered) available arm at the last time when arm j has been
selected. Then for each arm j such that j 6= i∗j it holds that
nj ≤ O(log T )
(
bj
w(i∗j )−w(j)
)2
. (4)
Proof. We will use the fact that by Equation (3) for each arm j and each arm t it holds that
wj ≤ Ij(t) ≤ wj + 2 bj rj(t).
Let t be the last round when arm i has been selected, and denote i = i∗j . Since arm i has been selected
in round t, it must have had the highest index at the time. Therefore
wi ≤ Ii(t) ≤ Ij(t) ≤ wj + 2 bj rj(t).
It follows that wi − wj ≤ 2 bj rj(t) = O(bj)
√
log T
nj
, which implies the desired bound (4).
4While C = 10 suffices for the analysis, prior work on UCB1-style algorithms (e.g. in [23, 25]) suggests that a smaller value
such as C = 1 can be used in practice.
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From now on assume that BudgetedUCB and the greedy benchmark are run on the same stack realization.
Arguments in which two random processes are run on a joint probability distribution (coupled) with the same
marginal distributions for each process are known in Probability Theory as coupling arguments.
We encapsulate the coupling argument in the following lemma. To state this lemma, recall that iB is the
last (highest-numbered) arm exhausted by the greedy benchmark if such arm exists, and 0 otherwise. Let iA
be the best (lowest-numbered) arm that is not exhausted by BudgetedUCB.
Lemma 3.5. (~m− ~n) · ~w ≤∑kj=max(iA,iB)+1 nj(wiA − wj) where iA ≤ iB + 1.
Proof. We consider three cases. The first case is when no arms are exhausted by the greedy benchmark.
Then iB = 0, and the greedy benchmark played arm 1 for T rounds, so m1 = T and mj = 0 for all j ≥ 2.
Therefore:
(~m− ~n) · ~w = (T − n1)w1 −
∑k
j=2 nj wj =
∑k
j=2 nj(w1 − wj).
Moreover, since the greedy benchmark has not exhausted arm 1, BudgetedUCB has not exhausted it either,
so iA = 1 and we are done.
For the other two cases let us assume that the greedy benchmark exhausts at least one arm (i.e., iB ≥ 1).
We claim that for each arm i ≤ iB it holds that ni ≤ mi. Indeed, the greedy benchmark exhausts each arm
i ≤ iB, and, since BudgetedUCB and the greedy benchmark use the same stack realization, BudgetedUCB
would also exhaust arm i after ni impressions, after which this arm would not be available. Claim proved.
The second case is that iB ≥ 1 and nj = mj for each arm j ≤ iB. Then iA = iB + 1. (Indeed, if
BudgetedUCB exhausted arm iB+1 then the greedy benchmark would have also exhausted it, contradiction.)
Let i = iA and note that ni ≤ mi. It follows that
(~m− ~n) · ~w =∑j≥i (mj − nj)wj
= (mi − ni)wi −
∑
j≥i+1 nj wj
=
∑
j≥i+1 nj (wi − wj).
The remaining third case is that iB ≥ 1 and nj < mj for some arm j ≤ iB. Then iA is the lowest-
numbered such arm; in particular, iA ≤ iB. Let i = iA and ℓ = iB + 1. Note that we do not know whether
nℓ ≤ mℓ, and so we have to allow for the possibility that nℓ > mℓ. Then:∑
j≤iB
(mj − nj)wj ≤ mwi where m ,
∑
j≤iB
(mj − nj)wj .
(~m− ~n) · ~w ≤ mwi − (nℓ −mℓ)wℓ −
∑
j≥ℓ+1 njwj
=
∑
j≥ℓ+1 nj(wi − wj) + (nℓ −mℓ)(wi − wℓ)
=
∑
j≥ℓ nj(wi − wj).
This completes the third case.
In all three cases we regroup the terms in the sums using the fact that
∑
i ni =
∑
imi = T .
Let i = max(iA, iB) and let S = {j > i : wiA −wj ≥ ǫ}. Then∑k
j=i+1 nj(wiA − wj) ≤ ǫT +
∑
j∈S nj(wiA − wj).
By Lemma 3.4, noting that i∗j ≤ iA, we have for each j > i that
nj ≤
O(b2j log T )
(w(i∗j )− w(j))2
≤ O(b
2
j log T )
(wiA − wj)2
.
6
Putting it all together, we obtain the following:
(~m− ~n) · ~w ≤ ǫT +
∑
j∈S
O(b2j log T )
wiA − wj
. (5)
For Theorem 1.1 we use a somewhat weaker corollary of Equation (5) which gets rid of iA.
(~m− ~n) · ~w ≤ ǫT + max
i∈{iB, iB+1}
k∑
j=i+1
O(b2j log T )
max(ǫ, wi − wj) . (6)
Using Corollary 3.2 and taking expectations in both sides of Equation (6), we obtain the desired regret
bound (1) in Theorem 1.1.
4 Related work
MAB has been an active area of investigation since 1933 [27], in Operations Research, Economics and
several branches of Computer Science: machine learning, theoretical computer science, AI, and algorithmic
economics. A survey of prior work on MAB is beyond the scope of this paper; a reader is encouraged to
refer to [13, 11] for background on prior-independent MAB, and to [26, 16] for background on Bayesian
MAB. Starting from [22], much of the work on MAB has been motivated by internet advertising. Below we
only discuss the work directly relevant to this paper.
The present paper continues the line of work on prior-independent MAB with stochastic rewards (where
the reward of a given arm i is an i.i.d. sample of some time-invariant distribution). The basic formulation
for MAB with stochastic rewards is well-understood ([20, 2] and the follow-up work, see [11] for references
and discussion).
Our formulation is a special case of sleeping bandits [19, 24] where in each round, a subset of arms is
not available (“asleep”) and the goal is to compete with the best available arm. Available arms for a given
round are chosen by an adversary. However, this adversary in [19, 24] is oblivious (it decides its selections
for all rounds before round 1), whereas in our problem it is adaptive (it decides its selection for round t only
after observing what happened before). This is a significant complication. To the best of our knowledge, the
results in [19, 24] do not extend to settings where available arms are chosen by an adaptive adversary.
Sleeping bandits are in turn a special case of contextual bandits, where in each round an oblivious
adversary provides a context x which determines which arms are available and, moreover, what are the
expected payoffs in this round. The goal is to compete with the best (available) arm for a given context.
Contextual bandits have been a subject of much recent work, see [11] for a survey.
Several recent papers consider MAB problems with a single limited resource that is consumed by the
arms. In such problems, each round yields a reward and a resource consumption, both of which may
(stochastically) depend on the chosen arm. A typical example is “dynamic selling”[10, 4], where a seller
has a limited supply of items and offers one item for sale in each round; the arms correspond to the offered
prices. Other examples include “dynamic buying” [7] (where a buyer has a limited budget of money and in-
teracts with a new seller in each round), and several versions in which the resource consumption for a given
arm is deterministic [17, 18, 28, 29]. To the best of our knowledge, no published prior work has addressed
MAB with multiple resources / budgets.
A very recent, yet unpublished, paper [8], concurrent with respect to this paper, considers a general-
ization of our setting in which the budgets can be specified for arbitrary subsets of ads. They design new
algorithms, based on techniques that are very different from ours. (Their algorithms and their analysis ex-
tend to a very general setting of MAB with arbitrary knapsack-style constraints, for which ad allocation is
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one of the application domains.) However, the guarantees in [8] for BudgetedAdsMAB are much weaker
than ours. Essentially, they obtain regret O(
√
kT (1 +
√
T/B)), where B is the smallest budget; this is
not a very strong guarantee if B is small. Moreover, their analysis does not imply an “optimistic” corollary
similar to Corollary 1.2(b).
Ad allocation. A large amount of work has addressed ad allocation in the internet settings. Most papers
in this area do not consider the issue of uncertainty on the CTRs. Some of the prominent themes is online
matching (of ads and webpages) and the design of ad auctions (where the key issue is that the advertisers
may strategically manipulate their bids if it benefits them). A more detailed discussion of this work is beyond
the scope of this paper; see Chapter 28 of [21] for background.
In the literature on ad auctions, most relevant to our work are the papers that address the strategic issues
jointly with the issue of uncertainty on CTRs and/or advertisers’ values-per-click (if these values change
over time). There are two somewhat distinct directions: dynamic auctions, in which the advertisers submit
bids over time (see [9] for a survey), and MAB mechanisms [6, 14, 5, 15], where the advertisers submit bids
only once, and the mechanism allocates ads over time.
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